Dependency Inventory, Lockfiles, and SBOM
What This Concept Is
This lesson teaches you to resolve direct and transitive components reproducibly and describe shipped software in machine-readable inventories. Supply-chain security establishes a verifiable path from reviewed source through controlled build and signed artifact to authorized workload. Every assurance claim must point to evidence and a verifier.
Why It Matters Here
Attackers target developer identities, dependencies, workflows, registries, build runners, deployment permissions, and platform defaults because one compromise can reach many systems. Integrity at one stage cannot compensate for an untrusted adjacent stage.
Concrete Example
Apply the mechanism to a containerized service built from a protected repository and deployed to Kubernetes. Introduce one authorized tampering or privilege flaw, observe whether provenance and admission detect it, contain the path, and preserve before-and-after evidence.
Common Confusion / Misconception
A common mistake is treating an SBOM, signature, scanner, lockfile, or SLSA level as security by itself. Each answers a bounded question. Verify identity, trustworthy build facts, artifact digest, policy, reachability, exception state, and the environment actually running the artifact.
How To Use It
- Map source, dependency, build, registry, promotion, and runtime trust.
- Assign separate identities and minimum permissions.
- Pin and inventory every build input.
- isolate untrusted code and protect secrets.
- Produce signed provenance for immutable artifacts.
- Verify policy at promotion and admission.
- Rehearse revocation, rebuild, and compromise response.